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ABSTRACT 15 
We present a novel Bayesian network model for assessing referee bias with respect to fouls and penalty kicks 16 
awarded. Unlike previous studies, our model takes into consideration explanatory factors which, if ignored, can 17 
lead to biased assessments of referee bias. For example, a team may be awarded more penalties simply because 18 
it attacks more, not because referees are biased in its favour. Hence, we incorporate causal factors such as 19 
possession, time spent in the opposition penalty box, etc. prior to estimating the degree of penalty kicks bias. 20 
The model is applied to the 2011-12 English Premier League season. Among our conclusions are that, in 21 
contrast to  previous studies, being the home team does not in itself result in positive referee bias.  Conversely 22 
Arsenal, a team of similar popularity and wealth and who finished third, benefited least of all 20 teams from 23 
referee bias at home with respect to penalty kicks awarded. 24 
Keywords: causal modelling, crowd effect, home advantage, officiating bias, soccer 25 
1 INTRODUCTION 26 
 27 
The notion that referees in Association Football (hereafter referred to simply as football) are 28 
biased towards certain teams or in certain contexts is widely accepted by football pundits and 29 
supporters. In fact, whether or not such bias exists is an area of increasing interest that attracts 30 
the attention of researchers from the domains of sport science, psychology, statistics and 31 
computer science. 32 
 Irrespective of the true underlying causes, there is no doubt that 'playing at home' has 33 
a significant impact on a team's success. This home advantage effect has been extensively 34 
studied (Courneya & Carron, 1992; Nevill & Holder, 1999; Hirotsu & Wright, 2003; Pollard 35 
& Pollard, 2005; Pollard, 1986; 2006; Poulter, 2009; Anders & Rotthoff, 2012; Constantinou 36 
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& Fenton, 2013). Numerous explanatory factors have been proposed for home advantage. 37 
The crowd effect is normally suggested as one of the most important factors (Agnew & 38 
Carron, 1994; Nevill et al., 1996; Nevill et al., 1999; 2002; Downward & Jones, 2007; 39 
Dohmen, 2008; Goumas, 2012) and is said to occur to a greater extent in leagues in which 40 
home crowds are more hostile and vociferous (Anders & Rotthoff, 2012). Other proposed 41 
factors include the travelling effect (Clarke & Norman, 1995), the familiarity with the playing 42 
grounds (Neave & Wolfson, 2003; Pollard, 2006), as well as referees themselves who are 43 
said to favour home teams on the basis of penalty kicks, free kicks, yellow/red cards and/or 44 
extra time data (Nevill et al., 1996; Nevill et al., 1999; 2002; Sutter & Kocher, 2004; Boyko 45 
et al., 2007; Downward & Jones, 2007; Dawson et al., 2007; Dohmen, 2008; Buraimo et al., 46 
2010; Goumas, 2012). However, the degree of influence of referee decisions relative to the 47 
overall home advantage effect has not been extensively studied. 48 
 It is apparent that the literature tends to indicate with strong belief that referee 49 
decisions favour the home team. However, some researchers (Page & Page, 2010) have 50 
questioned this outcome and expressed their uncertainty as "it could be the case that these 51 
biases do not manifest themselves into significant differences in terms of the overall 52 
performance of a team" (Page & Page, 2010); the increased number of fouls, yellow cards, 53 
red cards, penalties and so on in favour of the home team might simply be the result of the 54 
home team performing better than the away team. For example, if the home team is in control 55 
of the ball (possession) more often than not, then we would expect it to be awarded more 56 
fouls and penalties, and less yellow and red cards relative to the opponent, on the basis that 57 
its control of possession will lead to it being on the receiving end of more tackles. We should 58 
also expect a higher proportion of these to be committed nearer to the opponent's goal, as 59 
greater possession also tends to correspond to a marked territorial advantage. We agree that 60 
the kind of explanatory causal factors proposed in (Page & Page, 2010) must be incorporated 61 
into any study of referee bias. 62 
 Hence, in this paper we present a novel Bayesian network (BN) model developed for 63 
referee bias analysis in football. It is the most comprehensive attempt to date to include 64 
within-game explanatory variables in order to justify the observed discrepancies between 65 
fouls and penalty kicks awarded between adversaries prior to formulating beliefs about 66 
referee bias. Although previous attempts have been made to control within-game events such 67 
as shots, fouls and corners (Dohmen, 2008; Goumas, 2012), this paper integrates a number of 68 
important additional variables which are required for formulating a causal network model, .  69 
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The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the BN model, Section 3 discusses the 70 
results and Section 4 provides our concluding remarks. 71 
 72 
 73 
2 THE MODEL 74 
 75 
In this section we describe the BN model which was developed using the AgenaRisk BN tool 76 
(Agena Ltd., 2013).  Details about the role of qualitative judgments and how inference is 77 
done are provided in (Fenton et al., 2007; Neil et al., 2010; Fenton & Neil, 2012). 78 
 79 
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 80 
 81 
Figure 1. Bayesian network model topology; Components 1 and 2. 82 
 The data used to inform priors and provide observations for each of the teams is 83 
available online at (WhoScored?.com, 2012), although the data for number of penalties 84 
awarded was manually recorded by a member of the research team from bbc.co.uk/football. 85 
 The model is constructed on the basis of two components as illustrated by the model 86 
topology in Figure 1. Component 1 (described in Section 2.1) measures the referee bias over 87 
all fouls awarded, while Component 2 (described in Section 2.2) measures the referee bias 88 
over fouls awarded within the opposition penalty box (effectively penalty kicks). .  89 
 The model is used to assess the referee bias for each case at home, away, and overall.   90 
 91 
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 2.1. COMPONENT 1 92 
 93 
This component simply assumes that the fouls awarded in a game are a consequence of a 94 
team’s ability with respect to the following attributes (each corresponding to a node in the 95 
model): 96 
 97 
1. Possession: percentage of time the team is in control of the ball ; 98 
2. Pass accuracy: the percentage of successful passes (i.e. those that reach a team mate, ; 99 
3. Aerial duels: the percentage of aerial duels won ; 100 
4. Dribbles: the average number of times, per match instance, a player manoeuvres the 101 
ball around a player of the opposing team ; 102 
5. Interceptions: the average number of times, per match instance, a player intercepts a 103 
pass made by a player of the opposing team . 104 
 105 
 Subsequently, the referee bias is simply inferred by measuring the discrepancy
1
 in 106 
distributions between predicted (True fouls awarded node) and observed (Fouls awarded 107 
node) fouls awarded, with the bias level set to     in terms of variability between the two 108 
distributions.  109 
 Figure A.1 presents a BN example of this component with the observations of QPR 110 
and Arsenal as inputs when playing at away grounds. The comparison in Figure A.1 shows 111 
that even though Arsenal generated superior statistics for all of the five explanatory 112 
parameters, they were still awarded 1.1 fouls less per match instance compared to QPR. As a 113 
result, the Referee bias distribution provides weak evidence of Bias For for QPR and Bias 114 
Against for Arsenal. 115 
   116 
 117 
 118 
 119 
 120 
 2.2. COMPONENT 2 121 
 122 
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The second component represents the key process of determining referee bias given penalties 123 
awarded.  The steps can be enumerated as follows: 124 
 125 
1. We convert the possession rate into time spent (in minutes) holding the ball, and we 126 
use the positional statistics of Action Zones
2
 and Shot Zones
3
 to estimate the time 127 
spent respectively at a) opposition third, and subsequently at b) opposition penalty 128 
box. Essentially, we are only interested in (b), since there is where the penalties are 129 
awarded. 130 
 131 
2. We then measure the probability of being awarded a foul for each minute spent while 132 
in possession of the ball, at any part of the pitch, given the following two parameters: 133 
a) the rate of observed fouls awarded from Component 1, and b) time spent holding 134 
the ball (from step 1 above).  135 
 136 
Similar to step 2, we measure the probability of being awarded a foul for each minute spent 137 
while in possession of the ball in the opposition penalty box given the following two 138 
parameters: a) number of penalties awarded, and b) time spent holding the ball while in the 139 
opposition penalty box (from step 1b above). For the analysis we assume that fouls awarded 140 
within the penalty box are penalty kicks (there are examples of indirect free kicks in the 141 
penalty area but these are rare).  142 
After steps 2 and 3, we can compare the two inferred probability distributions and measure 143 
how the probability of fouls awarded per minute varies with fouls awarded per minute while 144 
in opposition penalty box. In doing so, the model takes account of the extra sensitivity of 145 
fouls committed inside the penalty area since a penalty kick awarded is very often decisive
5
 146 
on the final outcome. As a result, for this analysis we take into consideration the following 147 
widely accepted observations that a) when a player is defending in his own penalty box he is 148 
                                                          
2
 The positional statistical information regarding action zones (i.e. where the ball is played) is distributed in Own 
Third, Middle and Opposition Third. This information is used to estimate the time spent at each third of the 
pitch, while in possession of the ball. 
3
 The positional statistical information regarding shot zones (i.e. where do the shots come from) is distributed in 
6 Yards Box, 18 Yards Box, and Outside of Box. This information is used to estimate time spent at opposition 
penalty box while in possession of the ball (both the 6 Yards Box and the 18 Yards Box information contribute to 
time spent at opposition penalty box). 
5
 In particular, during our period of analysis, 72% of penalties awarded were converted by the attacking team, 
while a single goal would have been sufficient to decisively alter the balance of the overall result in 61% of 
matches played. 
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extra careful not to commit a foul, and b) the referee is also extra careful when awarding such 149 
fouls. Accordingly, the next step is: 150 
  151 
4. To let the model explain the discrepancies between the two inferred probability 152 
distributions (from steps 2 and 3) into the following two explanatory variables: 1) 153 
Carefulness by defenders, and 2) Carefulness by referees. Since we are only interested 154 
in inferring the referee bias, we assume that the level of carefulness by defenders is 155 
fixed and identical for all teams (the assumption we use is 'double careful'). The 156 
model then explains the residual variation in node Carefulness by referees; effectively 157 
referee bias (i.e. the less careful referees are the more penalties a team is awarded and 158 
thus, the higher the positive referee bias). In particular, we assume that if referees are 159 
more (respectively less) likely - all factors being equal - to award penalties to a 160 
particular team than to the other teams, then there is a degree of positive (respectively 161 
negative) bias towards that team. 162 
 163 
 164 
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 165 
 166 
Using data from the full English Premier League (EPL) season 2011-12, we have compared 167 
a) the referee carefulness given fouls awarded between teams (Component 1), b) the referee 168 
carefulness given penalties awarded between teams (Component 2), and c) the association of 169 
(a) and (b) inferences with crowd attendance and crowd density for each team. 170 
 Table C.1. presents the relative percentage increase in performance, for each of the 171 
explanatory variables, a team gained when playing at home relative to the away match 172 
performances. As expected, the average team demonstrated increases in possession (5.94%), 173 
pass accuracy (0.94%), aerial duels won (4.57%), successful dribbles (13.24%)  and fouls 174 
awarded (3.04%). When it comes to interception, the average team demonstrated a decrease 175 
of 1.34%, although this is not surprising since in order to be able to intercept the ball the 176 
opponent has to be in possession. However, the variability between teams for this particular 177 
factor is very high. 178 
.  179 
  180 
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 182 
 183 
 184 
 185 
 3.1. Referee bias given fouls awarded (Component 1) 186 
 187 
 188 
 189 
 190 
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 3.2. Referee bias given penalties awarded (Component 2) 192 
 193 
 Conversely, neither of the teams appear to have received similar benefit when playing away 194 
from home. But, what makes this result particularly interesting is that these two teams were 195 
the only teams fighting for the EPL title and until the very last league match (i.e. each 196 
accumulated 89 league points; an impressive 19 points more than Arsenal who finished 3
rd
). 197 
Taking into consideration both home and away match instances, however, Manchester United 198 
is still ranked 1
st
 in positive penalty kicks bias whereas Manchester City 4
th
 and Arsenal last. 199 
 200 
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 3.3. Referee bias and match attendance 204 
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 205 
 with their respective average crowd attendance and average crowd density. Crowd density is 206 
the attendance size divided by home stadium attendance. It has been suggested in the 207 
literature as a significant predictor of home referee bias (e.g. Boyko et al., 2007; Goumas, 208 
2012).  In contrast to previous studies, our results do not demonstrate any strong positive 209 
relationship between crowd attendance (or crowd density) and positive referee bias. For 210 
example Arsenal, with the second largest average attendance as well as the second largest 211 
average crowd density, were ranked last in terms of positive referee bias for penalties 212 
awarded. 213 
 214 
Table 3. Average home attendance and crowd density for all teams, ranked by home HPO. 215 
 216 
  
Team 
Average crowd 
attendance 
Average 
crowd density 
 Man United 75,387 99.06% 
 Man City 47,044 98.01% 
 Swansea 19,946 96.35% 
 Blackburn 22,551 70.12% 
 Stoke 27,225 95.92% 
 Fulham 25,293 98.50% 
 Norwich 26,605 97.74% 
 QPR 18,923 94.25% 
 Chelsea 41,477 99.14% 
 Liverpool 44,253 97.55% 
 Bolton 23,669 82.40% 
 Everton 33,228 81.90% 
 Wigan 18,633 74.46% 
 Aston Villa 33,873 79.17% 
 Newcastle 49,939 95.30% 
 West Brom 24,773 93.48% 
 Wolves 25,684 81.02% 
 Sunderland 39,095 79.78% 
 Tottenham 36,026 99.31% 
 Arsenal 60,000 99.28% 
 217 
 218 
   4 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK 219 
 220 
Any credible attempt to determine referee bias in football matches must take account of 221 
causal explanatory factors. We have presented a novel Bayesian network model for this 222 
purpose. The model enables us to account for the observed discrepancies in fouls and penalty 223 
kicks awarded between teams by taking into consideration causal factors such as possession, 224 
time spent in the opposition penalty box while in control of the ball, pass accuracy, the ability 225 
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to win aerial duels in the air, the ability to dribble the ball and the ability to intercept the 226 
opponent's pass.  227 
  228 
 However, this did not extend to away games (Manchester City, in fact benefited less than 229 
any other team away from home) nor to free kicks generally. The two Manchester clubs were, 230 
however, the only serious title contenders in an extremely close title-race. While popular lay 231 
theories suggest that referees have a tendency to favour elite clubs in general and Manchester 232 
United in particular, at their home stadiums, it is possible that the combination of home 233 
advantage and being a title-favourite team (which Manchester United have been since the 234 
Premier League inception) in a close-title race is what is more predictive of positive referee 235 
bias for penalty kicks awarded. To test such hypothesis properly would require applying the 236 
model over multiple seasons. 237 
 Other important results from applying our model to the 2011-12 EPL season run 238 
counter to the prevailing wisdom. For example, much of the previous literature suggests that 239 
the influence of home crowd is a leading factor in explaining the observed discrepancies of 240 
officiating behaviour between home and away teams (Nevill et al., 1996; Nevill et al., 1999; 241 
2002; Downward & Jones, 2007; Dohmen, 2008; Buraimo et al., 2010; Goumas, 2012). 242 
However, we found  that the home crowd alone is not associated with positive referee bias. It 243 
should be acknowledged that there is some evidence that refereeing bias varies from league to 244 
league in conjunction with crowd hostility (Anders & Rotthoff, 2012), and caution should 245 
therefore be exercised in generalising the findings of the present study to all of world football 246 
prior to the application of BN modelling to other major leagues. In order to formulate such a 247 
conclusion, one has not only to understand the degree of impact of home crowd on home 248 
advantage, but also to measure home advantage for individual teams before assessing referee 249 
bias. After all, crowd attendance and crowd density tend to vary in conjunction with team 250 
performance (i.e. teams which perform best tend to have a large fan base and thus larger 251 
stadiums). In (Constantinou & Fenton, 2013) the results show how home advantage can differ 252 
considerably between teams of the EPL, whereas (Clarke & Norman, 1995) reported that in 253 
many cases a team can even develop a negative home advantage.  254 
 It is also important to note that neither crowd size nor crowd density is necessarily 255 
correlated with crowd noise in the intuitive manner that might be expected. No published 256 
peer-reviewed study on noise-levels within the EPL stadiums exists, but 2008 and 2011 257 
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attempts to measure their decibel levels by Sky Sports
6
 and fanchants.com
7
 suggest little or 258 
no correlation, with several clubs with smaller attendances and lower crowd densities ranking 259 
above many of the elite teams in both studies. Factors such as differing stadium acoustics, fan 260 
demographics, and the varying levels of organisation and coordination of the most vocal 261 
elements of the home support likely play a part in this. It is also important to remember that 262 
in the EPL, a league with a high ratio of visiting supporters, there is often a very substantial 263 
level of vocal support for the away team also present at almost all fixtures, thus partly 264 
confounding the notion that larger crowd generating higher noise levels necessarily means 265 
greater vocal support for the home team. 266 
 Our results lead us to conclude that Page and Page (2010) were correct to question the 267 
effect of the home crowd in the absence of team performance. It appears that the explanatory 268 
variables taken into consideration by our model (which represent different aspects of team 269 
performance)  when it comes to free kicks and penalty kicks awarded between home and 270 
away teams; crowd attendance and crowd density are not related with positive referee bias.  271 
 Whether or not there are underlying factors not yet accounted for in our model (such 272 
as 'being title contenders', having 'great wealth' or even the possibility that referees secretly 273 
support these clubs), as well as the relevance of those factors with other aspects of referee 274 
bias (i.e. yellow and red card), is a matter for future research. If  information such as 275 
possession and positional statistics in combination with the ability to dribble, win aerial duels 276 
and so on) also becomes available for individual match instances (rather than overall as it was 277 
in our case) then we will be able to accurately determine referee bias with much higher 278 
confidence. This will be achieved by also looking at how certain teams might have further 279 
benefited by negative referee bias for their opponents in a match between them (i.e. the 280 
possibility that the two Manchester clubs benefited not only from penalties awarded, but also 281 
from penalties not awarded - i.e. Bias Against - for their opponents when playing against 282 
them). We anticipate that our model now lays out a coherent and rational strategy for 283 
conducting such research. 284 
  285 
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APPENDIX A: BN model examples with scenarios 364 
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 368 
 369 
Figure A.1. Assessing referee bias given overall fouls awarded; a Component 1 example given observations of 370 
QPR and Arsenal when playing at away grounds. 371 
 372 
 373 
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 374 
 375 
Figure A.2. Assessing referee bias given penalties awarded; a Component 2 example based on Manchester 376 
United home match data of the EPL season 2011-12. 377 
 378 
  379 
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APPENDIX B: Model description 380 
 381 
 382 
Table B.1. Description of the BN variable nodes 383 
 384 
 385 
 386 
  387 
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 Translated into minutes 
 
Node name 
Node 
ID 
 
Node type 
Observable/ 
Latent  
 
Description 
Possession POS         (        ) Observable where   is the mean probability value 
observed over   match instances, and  
   is the variance associated with   
Pass accuracy PA         (        ) Observable 
Aerial duels AD         (        ) Observable 
Dribbles DR      ( ) Observable  
where   is the expected value over   
match instances 
Interceptions INT      ( ) Observable 
Fouls Awarded FA      ( ) Observable 
True fouls awarded TFA      ( ) Latent 
 
Referee bias (overall) 
 
RBO 
        (        ) 
 
Ranked 
 
Latent 
with states ‘Bias For’, ‘No Bias’, and 
‘Bias Against’. Assuming ignorant 
prior (uniformly distributed) 
 
 
Action Zones 
 
AZ 
 
Labelled 
 
Observable 
with states ‘Own third’, ‘Middle third’, 
and ‘Opposition third’. 
 
 
Shot Zones 
 
SZ 
 
Labelled 
 
Observable 
with states ‘6 Yard Box’, ’18 Yard 
Box’, and ‘Outside of Box’. 
 
 
Minutes at opposition 
third 
 
MOT 
 
          (   ) 
 
Latent  (
 (      8) 
                 
) 
 
Minutes at opposition 
penalty box 
MOP          (   ) Latent 
 (
    
                    
) 
 
p(fouled per minute) FM      (   ) Latent 
    (
   
 (      )    
) 
 
p(fouled per minute in 
the penalty box) 
FMP Arithmetic Latent   
(     )
 
 
 
Penalties awarded 
 
PAW 
 
          (   ) 
 
Observable 
 (         ); where      
represents the number of gameweeks at 
home/away grounds (and 38 for overall 
assessment) 
 
 
Carefulness by 
defenders 
 
CD 
        (        ) 
 
Ranked  
 
Latent 
with states ‘No Extra Carefulness’, 
‘x2’, ‘x3’, ‘x4’ and ‘x5’. Assuming 
ignorant prior (uniformly distributed). 
 
 
Carefulness by referees 
(referee bias) 
 
CR 
        (        ) 
 
Ranked 
 
Latent 
with states ‘No Extra Carefulness’, 
‘x2’, ‘x3’, ‘x4’ and ‘x5’. Assuming 
ignorant prior (uniformly distributed). 
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APPENDIX C: Results 388 
 389 
Table C.1. Relative percentage increase, of the value of the explanatory variables, for home match instances 390 
relative to away match instances. 391 
EPL 
Position Team Possession 
Pass 
accuracy 
Aerial 
duels won Dribbles Interceptions 
Fouls 
awarded 
1 Man City 5.70% 3.07% 9.75% 8.54% 4.94% -25.66% 
2 Man United 8.36% 3.95% -5.15% 33.78% -0.66% -4.81% 
3 Arsenal 4.63% 2.15% 5.41% -3.03% -8.43% 17.17% 
4 Tottenham 5.47% 3.24% 4.73% 5.95% 1.60% -0.97% 
5 Newcastle 15.67% 3.18% 5.93% 21.05% -21.31% 16.19% 
6 Chelsea 6.72% 2.50% 18.09% 30.77% 14.74% 6.60% 
7 Everton 0.21% 2.22% 0.23% 61.76% -0.61% 15.31% 
8 Liverpool 6.57% 0.87% 3.70% 15.71% -2.96% -11.21% 
9 Fulham 2.07% -0.97% 7.29% -3.08% -7.39% -6.09% 
10 West Brom 5.44% 1.70% -0.81% 3.23% 5.63% 18.60% 
11 Swansea 6.08% 1.06% 6.05% 1.25% -3.23% 0.00% 
12 Norwich 3.74% 3.76% 7.39% 40.00% -10.77% -11.83% 
13 Sunderland 5.59% 0.81% -3.56% 18.37% -18.52% 12.63% 
14 Stoke 7.81% -4.78% -4.12% 2.78% 8.62% -4.72% 
15 Wigan 6.63% 1.13% 6.40% 4.05% 8.22% -10.26% 
16 Aston Villa 10.41% 2.50% 13.51% -1.75% -9.31% 5.43% 
17 QPR 4.34% -1.20% -1.03% 43.75% 7.19% 13.64% 
18 Bolton 5.33% -1.38% -8.82% -35.14% -9.90% 8.99% 
19 Blackburn 6.23% -2.59% 15.62% -12.12% 18.50% 14.61% 
20 Wolves 1.69% -2.33% 10.78% 28.95% -3.13% 7.07% 
Average - 5.94% 0.94% 4.57% 13.24% -1.34% 3.04% 
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